Douglas Valentine. The Phoenix Program. William Morrow & Co. 1990

Biography: Douglas Valentine is an acclaimed author and researcher. His works include The Strength of the Wolf: The Secret History of America’s War on Drugs, Hotel Tacloban, and the action adventure novel TDY, in addition to numerous articles. He has worked as a private investigator and provided expert testimony for Dr. Martin Luther King’s family during the King v.s. Jowers lawsuit.

Research Question/Hypothesis: Valentine’s book is an overview and expose of the previously understudied Phoenix Program, the intelligence, military, and internal security coordination program, developed by the CIA in Vietnam to neutralize the civilian infrastructure that supported the Viet Cong insurgency. Valentine uses his study of the role Phoenix played in the Vietnam War to ask what will happen if programs modeled after Phoenix continue to be used against newly defined enemies.

Data: The Phoenix Program was primarily based on interviews the author conducted with numerous Phoenix personnel and CIA officials who developed and oversaw the program. Government reports, action papers, and historical sources were also used.

Findings:

The SEALS, during Vietnam, operated in hunter-killer teams. Hunter teams consisted of 4 man units of Americans and counter-terrorists (CTs), paramilitary units of deserted enemy soldiers or S. Vietnamese criminals, and were responsible for locating an enemy. The killer team consisted of 12-25 S. Vietnamese Special Forces led by Green Berets who were responsible for killing the located enemy. (p.9-10)

The Phoenix program was developed in 1967 by the CIA to coordinate the existing counterinsurgency programs to neutralize the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). The VCI was defined as civilians who supported the VC. (p.13)

In 1664 French religious leaders and business partners formed the Society of French Missionaries to advance Christianity in Asia. The same year the French created the East India Co. (p. 20)

In 1941 Ho Chi Minh unified all of the existing nationalist groups to combat the French. He worked with the OSS while other Americans supported the French. (p.22)

In 1954 Edward Lansdale became active in Vietnam after managing counter-insurgency (CI) operations in the Philipines. Lansdale managed several programs in Vietnam that were eventually consolidated into the Phoenix program. Lansdale hired the Freedom Company, staffed by Filipinos, to train 2 paramilitary units that posed as refugee relief organizations and were supplied by Civil Air Transport (CAT). Lansdale’s ‘black’ propaganda program evolved directly into the Vietnamese Special Forces Luc Luong Duc Biet (LLDB), which reported directly to the presidential survey office. (p. 25-6)

The Freedom Company activated Operation Brotherhood, a paramedical team modeled after a typical special forces A team, that built dispensaries to use as a cover for covert operations. Operation Brotherhood spawned the Eastern Construction Co., which employed 500 Filipinos to construct roads and identify Viet Minh for S. Vietnamese security forces. (p. 27)

In 1955 Lansdale initiated the Civil Action Program with catholic refugees who had been trained by the Freedom Co. The Civil Action Program attempted to induce enemy soldiers to defect, organize rural people into self defense forces, promote Diem, and provide cover for counter-terror operations. It was mostly a failure. (p. 27)

In 1955 Ngo Dinh Diem banished the French from Vietnam and appointed Nguyen Nguc Le as the 1^st director of the National Police. Le was a longtime CIA asset who worked with the Freedom Company to organize the Vietnamese Veterans Legion, which extended the influence of the Can Lao party throughout Vietnam. The Vietnamese Veteran Legion, with advice and assistance from the U.S. Information Services (USIS) took over distribution of all existing newspapers. They sponsored the 1^st National Congress and introduced a few months later the National Revolution Movement, a political front group. (p. 27-8 )

In 1956 Diem issued ordinance 57-A, which replaced the custom of village self-governance with a system of village councils appointed by district and province chiefs. The district and province chiefs were appointed by Diem and hired security forces to collect money from the locals. (p. 28)

In 1956 Diem announced the Denunciation of the Communist Campaign under the advice of the CIA. The campaign was managed by security committees chaired by CIA advised security officers. (p. 28)

Rufus Phillips succeeded Lansdale in the Civic Action Program. (p. 29)

In 1955 Michigan State University (MSU) was contracted to provide Vietnam with technical assistance in 4 areas: public information, public administration, finance and economics, and police and security services. MSU’s police administration division spent $15 million of taxpayer money to build Vietnam’s internal security program. The MSU group was the vehicle through which the CIA managed S. Vietnam’s special police. (p. 31)

The Binh Xuyen in the local police force were replaced under Diem’s regime with the Surete who were renamed the Vietnamese Buruea of Investigation (VBI). The Surete were originally faithful to the French but after 1954 were faithful to the CIA. The VBI managed the central record depository and were the most powerful security force in the country. VBI officials trained at the Intl. Police Academy at Georgetown University. The VBI was a foundation for the Phoenix program. (p. 32)

Room P-40 in the Saigon zoo was used by the US as a morgue and a torture chamber. (p. 32)

The VBI annually produced the Ban Tran Liet Viet Cong, a document which compiled notes from agents who had infiltrated VC meetings, which served as the basis for anti- VCI operations until 1964. (p. 33)

The 10/59 law stated that anyone convicted of acts of sabotage or infringement on national security could be sentenced to death or life imprisonment without appeal. 10/59 resulted in 50,000 political prisoners in 1959. (p. 33)

The Vietcong’s (VC) policy of non-violence changed with the organization of the Lao Dong Central Committee’s 559^th Transportation and Support Group, or Doan 559, a combat engineer corp. U.S. Army Special Forces commandos worked in 12 member A teams of Green Berets and organized paramilitary units rurally and SWAT teams in urban areas to fight them. (p. 34)

In 1959 William Colby arrived in Saigon as the CIA deputy station chief where he managed paramilitary operations and oversaw deep-cover case officers like Air America executive Clyde Bauer. Clyde Bauer brought the Council on Foreign Relations, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Lion’s Club to S. Vietnam. (p. 35)

The Public Safety Division of the Agency for International Development (AID/PSD) was created by CIA officer Byron Engel in 1954 to provide technical assistance and training to police and security officials in 52 countries. AID/PSD absorbed CIA agents from the VBI advisory unit that was formerly under the cover of the MSUG. In 1959 AID/PSD in Saigon was managed by Frank Walton and field officers were directed by the CIA managed Combined Studies Group. (p. 35)

Agrovilles were built in an effort to keep rural communities away from the Viet Cong. When construction of an agroville was completed the army would destroy villages and force the residents to relocate there. The agroville was defended by Regional Forces and the Popular Force who were trained and advised by the US Army, the CIA, and AID/PSD. The agroville program was renamed the strategic hamlet program. (p. 36)

William Colby and Gilbert Lawton launched the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) based on French commando programs where outsiders would infiltrate a VC stronghold and lead a local guerilla force to spread propaganda to enlist defectors. (p. 37)

VC leadership was organized at top by the Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN), an executive committee that answered to the Lao Ding Central Committees Reunification Dept. in Hanoi. COSVN directed the activity of the People’s Revolutionary Party, the National Liberation Front, and the Liberation Army. COSVN orders were sent to 6 regional committees in S. Vietnam. (p. 38)

The People’s Revolutionary Party (PRP) and party secretaries directing VC operations at the regional and district level were the primary targets of the Phoenix program. (p. 39)

The organization of the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) in 1961 was the beginning of Phoenix. (p. 41)

Ngo Dinh Diem, through Dr. Tuyen, filled his party faction with formerly blacklisted dissenters including Col. Pham Ngoc Thao who was appointed to manage the strategic hamlet program, formerly the agroville program, in 1962. Thao had clandestine communist connections and his loyal followers included Nguyen Cao Ky. (p. 41-2)

The CIA’s Counter-Terror doctrine in S. Vietnam was developed by Ralph Johnson, a veteran of the Flying Tigers who had an affair with Nguyen Cao Ky’s wife. Johnson’s doctrine was called Contre Coup and was based on the use of selective terror. The doctrine called for propaganda teams to visit villages and gain trust while spreading information about the enemy. 1 person accused of conspiring with the enemy would be killed to deter other villagers from working with them. The Contre Coup theory was formulated in the Phillipines in the mid ‘50s and in Indonesia 1957-1958. Johnson was transferred to S. Vietnam in 1961 to organize the Mountain Scouts with Stu Methven. The Mountain Scouts were commando groups that were a unilateral CIA operation managed by CIA control province and district chiefs. Stu Methven was able to install the program in 13 provinces and expand the program to 15,000 men. The Mountain Scouts eventually came under the control of the Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) (p. 43-6)

CIA controlled counter-terror teams (CTs) would enter villages disguised as VCs and commit an act of selective terror against an ethnic rival so that the villagers would run to a refugee camp or strategic hamlet for protection where they would then be recruited to fight against the VCs. (p.46)

CIA information management is referred to as black propaganda and is a job of the political and psychological (PP) officers in the covert action branch. (p. 48)

The U.S. Information Service (USIS) is the international branch of the US Information Agency. It uses all forms of media, propaganda, and censorship functions to promote the American way of life. USIS played an important role in supporting the Phoenix program. (p. 49)

Frank Scotton was the USIS agent most involved with the Phoenix program. Scotton was trained at the CIA sponsored East-West Center at the University of Hawaii where SE Asians were trained then sent back to Cambodia, Laos, or Vietnam to create agent nets. Scotton worked closely with Everett Bumgartner, chief of USIS field ops. in Vietnam, John Paul Vann from the US military and province chief Col. Tran Ngoc Chau, a Fort Bragg graduate. Their partnership played a major role in the phoenix program. (p. 49-50)

3 days after the assassination of John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson signed National Security Action Memorandum 273, which authorized covert military operations against N. Vietnam and paved the way for full scale US intervention. OPLAN 34A was developed by the Pentagon’s Pacific Branch and directed attacks against N. Vietnam. The Special Operations Group (SOG) formed in Saigon to implement it. (p. 53)

The Hoa Cam Training Center near Dan Nang was the center of many Phoenix missions. Johnson’s Mountain Scouts were trained there in 1961 and special operations personnel trained there in long range reconnaissance patrols. (p. 60)

Psywar terror tactics were commonly used with the subliminal purpose of driving people to dependence on the government or military. (p. 62-3)

A common counter terror technique was to bring 3 people in for an interrogation then kill 2 of them before they had a chance to speak. (p. 63)

The Vung Tau peninsula was used as an opium transshipment point for the French. The CIA used it to train CTs, census grievance, and political action cadres. Vung Tao was only accessible by Air America. (p. 64)

The census grievance program consisted of a census being taken of each village. Once a month, every head of household was required to talk to the census grievance officer who asked 3 questions: what would you like the Government of Vietnam (GVN) to do for you? Is there anybody in the GVN giving you a hard time? is there anything you want to tell me about VC? The census grievance program generated a lot of intelligence. (p. 66)

VC recruitment at the village level was based initially on family ties. (p. 73)

In 1962, the National Police initiated the family census program that listed the names and took a group photo of every family in S. Vietnam. (p. 73)

In 1964, the police special branch formed from the Vietnam Bureau of Investigation (VBI) to separate the work of Political Action Teams (PATs) working to gain the trust of villagers from interrogators. The Police Special Branch was centered in the Province Intelligence Coordinating Committees (PICCS) in S. Vietnam’s provinces. (p. 74)

The Police Special Branch coincided with the creation of the Special Exploitation Services (SES), GVN’s counterpart to the Special Operations Group (SOG), which cooperated with the Special Branch and the CIO. (p. 74)

In Oct. 1964 the Hopt Tac (Pacification Intensive Capital Area) program introduced 2500 national policemen into 7 provinces. In Oct. 1964 the National Identification and Family Census programs were consolidated in the National Police Directorate’s Resources Control Bureau. A public safety advisor was placed in each region to manage the program. (p. 75)

Tom Donahue arrived in Saigon to replace Cliff Strathern as chief of covert action. He worked out of the embassy managing a training camp at Vung Tau. Census Grievance was his pet program. (p. 65-6)

In 1965 Frank Scotton was asked to apply the motivational indoctrination program at Hop Tac, designed to improve close combat skills, across the country in an effort to combine police and paramilitary programs. Scotton formed paramilitary reaction forces in 7 key districts. The forces were trained at Hu Ngoc Tau Special Forces Camp where the SOG based its C5 program for operations inside Cambodia. Scotton was asked to implement his program in SOG regional camps in support of Project Delta, the successor of Leaping Lena. (p. 75)

In Project 24, VC deserters were coerced to join special reconnaissance teams that were trained in Vietnam then sent to Cambodia to locate enemy sanctuaries. When the team reported the location to the CIA the location would be bombed. Noone survived Project 24 missions. (p. 76)

John Patrick Muldoon was the 1^st director of Province Interrogation Centers (PICS) in Vietnam. (P. 76)

Col Kim Chong Pil was director of the Korean CIA (K-CIA). The K-CIA and the CIA ran a joint interrogation center at Yon Don Tho outside Seoul. The K-CIA recruited agents the same way the CIA recruited staff for the CIO. John Winne, a top CIA psychiatrist, was sent to Seoul to select the initial cadre using the Wechsler, a CIA developed psychological assessment test. The same process to select staff is used in every country where the CIA operates. (p.77)

The National Interrogation Center (NIC) was built in 1964 and served as the CIO headquarters where civilian, military, and police intelligence was coordinated by the CIA. (p. 78)

The Province Interrogation Center (PIC) program was the forerunner to the PICC program. PICs were established in 1964 and were designed to extend CIO operations into the provinces. The PICC program was designed to serve as a province’s senior intelligence agency and coordinate all civilian, military, and police operations. (p. 80)

Through PICs, the CIA learned the identity and the structure of the VCI in each province. Counter Terror teams were used to eliminate VC members and destroy their organization. (p. 80)

Through Pacific Architects and Engineers (PA & E) the CIA logistics staff hired local contractors to build interrogation centers in each province. The interrogation centers were funded by the special branch budget. (p. 81)

In 1966 John Muldoon was transferred to Thailand to build an interrogation center in Ugdorn where the CIA ran the war in Laos from an Air America base. Bob Hill replaced John Muldoon in Vietnam and in 1968 replaced him in Thailand. (p. 81)

The interrogation process: newly brought in prisoners were checked by medics, given a shower, weighed, photographed, and identified. The primary job of the PIC officer is to turn VCI agents into special branch agents and maintain a network of informants. (p. 83)

The translations in interrogation reports were never considered totally reliable. (p. 84)

Low level VCI were transferred to a PIC after they went through military intelligence. High level VCI were sent to the regional interrogation center or the NIC in Saigon (p. 85)

In mid 1966 U.S. military intelligence employed 1,000+ agents in S. Vietnam paid through the 525^th Intelligence Contingency Fund. (p. 87)

In 1965, the SOG organized cross-boarder operations, such as Operation Prairie Five and Project 404, to locate targets in Laos and Cambodia. (p. 90)

In 1965, a plan was developed to provide the National Police with a paramilitary field force that had the mission and skill of CT team and worked jointly with military. Col. William Pappy Grieves was a senior advisor to the National Police Field Forces and worked with Australian CIA agent Ted Serong, under cover as an AID consultant. The idea for a police field force was suggested by Robert Thompson and modeled after CI operations in Malaya. By 1967 the Field Police had 12,000 men and 59 companies (p. 91-6)

The Phoenix program arose from the CIA managed programs of Census Grievance, RD Cadre, CT teams, and PICs, military intelligence working with MSS, ARVN intelligence, and Vietnamese Regional and Popular Forces, which were brought together and coordinated by the special branch. (p. 99)

Nelson Brickham joined the CIA in 1949 where he worked in the Office of Current Intelligence and produced the Caesar Project, a study on the selection of Soviet leaders after Stalin’s death. In 1955 Brickham transferred to the Soviet Russia (SR) division of the Directorate of Plans, which housed CIA clandestine operations. Brickham developed a systems approach to researching an enemy, which focused on utilizing all available sources of information; it served as a conceptual basis for phoenix. Brickham managed CIA operations in Tehran from 1960-4 and in 1966 was assigned to Vietnam as the chief of Special Branch field operations under John Hart, the station chief. (p.100-4)

Special Branch operations were: hamlet informant programs, the PICs, and agent penetrations. (p. 109)

A special unit to handle high level VCI penetration was created by the CIA and run by Sam Drakulich. The unit supplied blacklists of VC to special CT units in Saigon. The unit was consolidated into a new unit created by Howard ‘Rocky’ Stone and controlled by Burke Dunn. (p. 111)

The Roles and Missions study, conducted by the Saigon embassy in 1966 under George Jake Jacobson, made 88 recommendations for the pacification of the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). It determined that the Police Special Branch was responsible for the destruction of the VCI. (p. 114)

The Office of Civil Operations (OCO) formed in Oct 1966 to overcome bureaucratic infighting between the CIA and the military over control of VCI pacification. OCO consolidated the field operation units run by AID, USIS, and CIA and organized them into branches for psychological operations, political action, defectors, public safety, refugees, and economic development. Wade Latham was OCO’s director and Gen. Paul Smith was his deputy. OCO assigned a regional director to each of the IV Corps. In 1967, Pres. Johnson incorporated OCO into Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) under the Revolutionary Development Support Directorate managed by Gen. William Knowlton; it was renamed Military Assistance Command for Civil Op. and Revolutionary Dev. (CORDS) (p. 115-6)

The reorganization of 1966 placed control of the CIA’s covert action program, previously under Renz Hoeksema, under the officer in charge of Revolutionary Development Cadre, Operations (RDC/O), which oversaw all paramilitary operations in the province. The police field operations, previously under Neil Brickham, was placed under the control of the officer in charge of Revolutionary Development Cadre, Plans (RDC/P), which served as the Special Branch liaison in the province. Lou Lapham, formerly a professor with a background in propaganda and psychological warfare, was appointed Saigon’s deputy station chief and chief of the Revolutionary Development Cadre (RDC). (p. 116)

Cong Tac IV was a special task force that evolved from Project Corral, an intensive intelligence program begun in spring 1966 by the Combined Intelligence Staff (CIS), and Operation Fairfax, which was organized by Gen. McChristian, General Loan, and Prime Minister Ky to search out and destroy VC guerilla units and infrastructure. Cong Tac IV combined intelligence, police, and military action for an assault on the VCI base in Saigon. By April 1967, Cong Tac IV had entered 6500 names of individuals suspected of being VC in a central database and were adding 1200 monthly. Search units of field police platoons accompanied military units to find the individuals on the blacklists.

(p. 120-4)

The systematic identification and location of the VC and the rapid retrieval of date in a useable form was made possible by the use of an automated data processing system located at the Combined Intelligence Center. (p. 120)

Tulius Acampora served as the CIA advisor to Gen. Loan in 1966. (p. 121)

The Phung Hoang program, the Vietnamese counterpart to Phoenix, was developed by Special Branch Deputy Director Col. Dang Van Minh and was meant to prevent VC infiltration of political parties in Saigon. The program required all Vietnamese agencies to forward information on the VCI to the Special Branch for inclusion in the political order of battle file. (p. 122)

The District Intelligence and Operations Coordination Center (DIOCC) was established by CIA officer Bob Wall to create in the districts what the PICs were doing in the provinces. It served as a clearinghouse of information and was based on what the British had done in Malaya. The DIOCC established in Diem Ban in 1967 was the model for phoenix facilities built throughout Vietnam. (p. 125-6)

In May 1967 Nelson Brickham was ordered by John Hart to write a plan for a general staff for pacification that was to review the strategy, structure, and management of the VCI pacification effort. The paper decided that pacification efforts would ultimately depend on civilian organizations, such as the police. The paper proposed creating a board of directors that had a representative from each civilian and military agency then established a reporting system. The organizational model established in Brickham’s paper was borrowed from the Ford Motor Company and became the basic structure for ICEX (Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation). ICEX was composed of joint committees at the national, corp, province, and district level with Robert Komer at the top as chairman of the board. The ICEX directorate in Saigon served as the command post for Komer’s orders and was subdivided into 3 units: the intelligence unit, the operations unit, and the reports management unit. ICEX field operations were added onto the CIA’s liaison and covert action program and an ICEX province coordinator was established to build and supervise the DIOCCs and to generate attacks against the VCI. (p. 127-32)

In 1967 Nelson Brickham was replaced by Evan Parker, a Jedburgh, an elite OSS class trained at Camp David, who had served as a courier to the Far East and a case manager in Hong Kong and China, who became the 1^st director of ICEX. (p. 53-4)

Pres. Johnson gave Robert ‘Blowtorch’ Komer a mandate that placed him in charge of the reorganization of the Republic of Vietnam’s armed forces, management of the 1967 Vietnamese presidential elections, and the economy of S. Vietnam. There was instant approval from the S. Vietnamese democracy for programs Komer supported. (p. 134)

The Special Branch was established for internal surveillance and operations against the VCI but prior to ICEX the majority of their work focused on targeting opposing political parties to keep the U.S. supported regime in control. (p. 136)

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) issued the staff paper “Intelligence, Intelligence Coordination, and Exploitation for Attack Against the VC Infrastructure” or MACV 381-41 on July 9 1967, which officially established the ICEX program. Jim Ward, a CIA agent who had served in Malaya in 1948, helped write the paper. (p. 137)

ICEX was created so that the 10,000 intelligence reports produced monthly by civilian and military agencies could be collated, analyzed, and interpreted to allow for an immediate reaction operation. (p. 138)

Evan Parker and John Hart visited each regional officer in charge (ROIC) unit to debrief them on MACV 381-41. In July 1967 the ROICS were: Jack Horgan in I Corps, Dean Almy in II Corps, Kinlock Bull in IV Corps, and Bob Wall in III Corps. ICEX was coined Operation Phoenix by Jack Horgan. (p. 139-41)

Nelson Brickham’s paper, “Action Program for Attack on VC Infrastructure 1967-8” represented Komer’s administrative and operational directives for ICEX. (p. 142)

The initiation of the Phoenix program drew support away from Cong Tac IV and allowed for the Tet offensive. Gen. Loan tried to warn officials about the Tet offensive 60 days in advance. (p. 148)

Tab 10 of Brickham’s action report addressed the problem of the civilian detention system and detainees from village sweeps. Brickham transferred the problem to the plans and programs element of the ICEX staff The ICEX staff stated the problem as: the substandard living conditions and indiscriminate crowding of POWs, criminals, VC suspects, and innocent by-standards in ramshackle detention facilities, lack of appropriate screening of prisoners, and problems with the judicial system. To rectify these problems it was suggested that: permanent detention facilities be constructed, a registration system be implemented, and judicial reform take place. The Research and Analysis division of CORDs conducted an in-depth study on the judicial handling and detention of the civilian infrastructure. (p. 151-2)

Randolph Berkley worked under Evan Parker in Saigon in 1967 and managed the SIDE (screening, interrogation, and detention of enemy) program. He drafted a plan to make prisons secure from attack, which included transferring VC prisoners to Con Son Island and providing prisons weapons and trained guards. (p. 152-3)

ICEX memo #5 released on Nov. 2 1967 created the Combined Tactical Screening Center where the detaining unit screened, interrogated, and classified the detainees and decided if they should be sent to a POW camp, provincial jail, or PIC. (p. 153)

Robert Slater directed the PIC program from 1967-1969. Torture was commonly used by Vietnamese interrogators but Americans were never directly implicated. The important VCI prisoners were transferred from a PIC to the National Police Interrogation Center (NPIC), which held between 300-400 prisoners. (p. 155-6)

The Police Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) and the Field Police were the main action programs of Phoenix. The Field Police accompanied military cordon and search operations to make arrests. Before 1967 the PRU teams were called the Counter Terror (CT) teams and were organized by the CIA on the province level. The PRU became a national program with the creation of ICEX and was managed by CIA officer William Redel. The PRU mission was to target the political infrastructure of the VC, to gather and compile accurate information about it, and to react to that information with operations that would destroy the infrastructure. (p. 161-7)

The creation of the PRU was an attempt to sanitize the CT teams. (p. 169)

Thieu’s Presedential Directive Decree Law 280, written by Robert Slater, legalized the Phung Hoang program, the Vietnamese counterpart to Phoenix. Law 280 was used as an excuse by Thieu to eliminate political opposition through a loose description of VCI cadre. (p. 185-8)

In Aug. 1968 Phung Hoang committees existed in 42 provinces and 3 districts, 190 DIOCCs were built at an average cost of $15,000. 140 DIOCCs were fully operational, and 32 PIOCCs were operational. (p. 190)

The CIA issued 2 handbooks to facilitate Operation Phoenix: the VC Key Organization from Central Level down to Village and Hamlet Level, which outlined the VC infrastructure, and the Phoenix Directorate’s 1^st manual of procedures, which outlined the phoenix program from the Saigon directorate to the DIOCCs (p. 190)

Neutralization rates were determined to be the only objective way to measure the success of the phoenix program. In Jan 1968 more than 6,000 VCI were killed with the exact #’s available at the DIOCCs. Komer set the objectives/quotas for the number of VC that should be neutralized. Bob Wall said, “quotas gave starving policemen a way to feed their families. It let them bring in bodies and say they were VCI”. Evan Parker said, “they had quotas and they tried to meet quotas and that’s how you get the idea that this was some sort of murder organization.” (p.191)

In 1967 50 Vietnam veterans were invited to join a Presidentially Directed Counter-Insurgency (CI). They went through extensive training and most were assigned to the provinces as RDC/P or RDC/O advisers and went on to become Phoenix coordinators. (p. 198)

Project Gamma or detachment B-57 was commissioned by the CIA to organize cross-border CI operations to find out who in the Cambodian government was helping North Vietnamese Army (NVA) or the VC. (p. 211)

Pacific Architect and Engineers was commissioned to build the DIOCCs. (p. 220)

The Phoenix district advisors were rarely CIA due to the high risk of combat. The district advisors were usually army people who had just graduated college and went through a basic training course at Fort Holabird. (p. 226)

Operation Phoenix helped suppress layout opposition parties and prevent a neutral Vietnam government. (p. 234)

The CIA estimated that the North Vietnamese Army had 40,000 soldiers stationed in Cambodia. In 1969 the US began to bomb Cambodia with the consent of Prince Norodom Sihanouk. (p. 253)

Nov. 1968 William Colby replaced Robert Komer as head of DEPCORDS and reported directly to National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. Colby’s pacification plan was divided into 3 main categories: military operations generated from Phoenix intelligence, such as air raids, artillery barrages, and search and destroy operations, territorial security, and internal security. In 1969 Revolutionary Development’s Regional and Popular Forces merged into the Territorial Security Forces advised by the Mobile Advisory Team (MAT) under CORDS. The strategy for internal security was implemented through the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) that had as its goal creating an additional 1200 secure hamlets and was followed by a full year pacifcation and development program facilitated by the Central Pacification and Development Council. Under Colby’s new plan, the top priority of Revolutionary Development programs became supplying information to Phoenix and the PRU became a part of Phoenix. (p.254-7)

In Aug 1968 Robert Komer imposed a quota of 1800 neutralized VCI a month. (p. 258)

The Viet Cong Infrastructure Information System (VCIIS) began in Feb 1966 when Robert Macnamara established the SE Asia Program Division and began the era of computerized blacklists. The Combined Intelligence Staff fed the names of 3,000 VCI into an IBM 1401 computer. The VCIIS also compiled information produced by all field units monthly summary reports and monthly activity listing with each neutralized VCI. In Jan 1969 VCIIS was renamed the Phung Hoang Management Information System (PHMIS) (p. 259)

In Jan 1967 Robert Komer introduced the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), which consisted of 18 factors, which were subject to computer analysis and rated the security of the hamlet. 1500 hamlets were rated in S. Vietnamese. (p. 260)

In July 1968 Phoenix advisors issued the Yellow Book, officially titled the Modus Operandi of Selected Political Cadre, prepared by the CIA under the cover of RAND. It described the operational patterns and procedures of the VCI and suggested actions that could be taken against them. In Nov. 1968 JOP2 was published on how to manage DIOCCs. In Dec 1968 the Green Book, officially titled the Current Breakdown of Executive Significant VCI Cadre, was published. Other publications included a bi-weekly newsletter through which advisors shared interrogation techniques. (p. 260-1)

In 1968 the Phoenix Coordinators Orientation Course (PCOC) was introduced and managed by MACV. (p. 261)

In 1968 Joe Sartiano, former Executive Director of the Phoenix Directorate, began to write a plan that placed the Phoenix program under the control of the National Police.

(p. 261)

In 1968, Lt. Col. Walter Kolon was put in charge of the training camp at Vung Tau where the Phoenix staff and the PRU were trained separately. Kolon worked with the CIA in 1965 as part of the Special Military Intelligence Advisory Team (SMIAT), assembled by CIA agent William Tidwell to run black operations against the VCI. Kolon oversaw the bi-monthly Phoenix Coordinators’ Orientation Course. (p. 262-3)

US policy in Vietnam was based on #’s of VC in Vietnam that were falsified according to Sam Adams, CIA analyst. In a 1982, the CBS documentary “The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception” accused Gen. William Westmoreland of deliberately covering up falsified statistics. Westmoreland filed a $120 million libel suit against CBS. Information was introduced during the trial that the CIA estimated there were 120,000 VC integral to the insurgency. National Security Advisor Walt Rostow showed Pres. Johnson a chart that indicated enemy strength dropped from 285,000 in 1966 to 242,000 in 1967. This information led to the 1975 congressional inquiry led by Otis Pike. (p. 273)

The CIA develops and tests programs through a covert asset, then if it is approved and supported by US policy objectives, it is turned over to overt US agencies. (p. 276)

Late 1960s the CIA began to phase out its programs in Vietnam. The initiative was spearheaded by Ted Shackley. Pacification programs including the PRU were given to the GVN and CORDS provided the transition. Census Grievance was dismantled; aspects of the program were taken over by Revolutionary Development (RD) and the Hamlet Evaluation System. Territorial Security merged into RD. On Dec. 14 1968 MACV notified DEPCORDS of their intention to take over the Phoenix program and other intelligence matters. In June 1969 Phoenix was transferred to MACV. (p. 277)

Chieu Hoi, managed from 1966-’69 by Ogden William then by Eugene Bable, was a defector program that consisted of a political indoctrination training that lasted 40-60 days. Chieu Hoi advisors were from the US Information Services. If a defector had information on the VCI he was sent to a PIC or to military interrogation. By 1969 more than 100,000 defectors were processed through 51 Chieu Hoi centers. (p. 281)

The Popular Information Program, an intensive publicity campaign run by psywar teams, began in Oct 1969 and utilized Phoenix supplied radios, leaflets, posters, TV shows, movies, banners, and loudspeakers on trucks. Psychological operations to support Phoenix was a potent weapon against the VCI. (p. 284)

Phoenix operations in the province developed when the province chief assigned resource control to the phoenix coordinator who mounted 3 concurrent operations. Mobile resource control checkpoint were established with national and field police assigned to roadblocks while the PRU apprehended those on a blacklist. Special airmobile resource control (SARC) teams were established to interdict VCI commerce and were coordinated with hunter-killer teams to neutralize the VCI. Operation Cutoff was enacted to capture suspects that could produce leads on the VCI. The DIOCCs sent a list to the PIOCCs where priority targets were selected then Territorial Forces used to capture them. (p. 286)

‘Big Mack’, a reporting system that served as an instructive document to direct the territorial intelligence systems and to quantitatively and qualitatively evaluate the VCI, was developed to respond to the need for judging, evaluating, and proving the success of the Phoenix program. ‘Big Mack’ reported on the # of identified and unidentified VCI, their influence in an area, and their identity by position. Big Mack reflected the military mentality and placed emphasis on large body counts. Big Mack’s reports from S. Vietnam’s 250 provinces were sent to a central database in Saigon. In March 1969 the National Police Evaluation System that recorded data from police assignment went on-line. In 1970 Big Mack was replaced by its bilingual equivalent the Big Mack Special Collection Program, which shifted reporting and accountability to the Republic of Vietnam’s (RVN) Territorial Intelligence System. In 1970 the VCI Neutralization Information System was implemented to record anti-VCI operations. In 1970 the National Police Criminal Information System (NPCIS) was implemented to track the VCI and was designed to interface with the Chieu Hoi tracking program and the VCI Neutralization and Identification Information System. The National ID Registration Program System, which compiled the fingerprints and IDs of PIOOC detainees, served as a complementary tracking system. The computer process climaxed in Jan 1971 with the National Police Infrastructure Analysis Sub-System II (NPIASS-II), which was used to plan attacks against the VCI. NPIASS-II functioned until 1973 when technicians from the Computer Science Corp. transferred it, along with PHMIS and the National Police Identification Follow-up Sub-Systems (NPIFUSS), to the Vietnamese. The National Police Directory Table Sub-System tracked the Nation Police units and corrections centers. (p.288-90)

On March 24 1969, the Ministry Interior Circular 757, “Classification-Rehabilitation Guidelines for proper processing of VCI”, created by William Colby was released. The circular reiterated that communist offenders be divided into class A, B, and C offenders, how long they were to be detained, and who was to decided. It directed the coordination of the National Police with the Phung Hoang Committee and directed the National Police to establish Psywar Groups to rehabilitate communist offenders and teach them how to live in and abide by the government. It also ordered the GVN’s Directorate of Corrections to form 5 mobile corrections group with cadre skilled in propaganda to support psywar groups in political indoctrination. (p. 291-2)

In Sept. 1969, the CIA created GVN’s Central Security Committee to oversee psywar and intelligence operations inside correctional facilities. (p. 292)

Tucker Googleman, Phil Potter, Rod Landrem and Ralph Johnson were intimately involved in the CIA’s policy on phoenix, the Special Branch, and the PRU. (p. 296)

In March 1969, Decree 044 was released which put the PRU under the control of the National Police, which provided the CIA with plausible denial and allowed them to scapegoat the GVN. (p. 296)

The Pentagon had 3 elements involved in Phoenix: the Joint Chiefs were involved through the Special Assistant (to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) for Counterinsurgency and Special Activity (SACSA), the Defense Dept. was involved through the Office of International Security Assistance (ISA), and MACV was involved through CORDS. SACSA was divided into 3 parts: special operations in S. Vietnam, special operations elsewhere, and RD programs in Vietnam. SACSA received policies from the National Security Council in the White House or through MACV on specific counterinsurgency and psywar ideas. SACSA presented recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff who made the final decision on how policy was to be implemented. The services or agencies responsible for implementing policy were directed to provide manpower, material, and money. The ISA had overall supervision of Phoenix and coordinated State and Defense Dept. policy on Vietnam. The Vietnam Task Force (VNTF) was created within the ISA to manage U.S. policy in Vietnam and coordinated Phoenix policy between Saigon and Washington. (p. 297-8)

In Feb. 1970 Phoenix’s 3^rd Standard Operating Procedure manual was issued with instructions on how to use the VCI target folder, a management tool that was designed to help Phoenix advisors focus on high level VCI. The folder was divided into 2 sections with the targets biographical information on the left and on the right operational information like the targets habits, contacts, schedule, etc… The target folder was the responsibility of the Special Branch case manager at the DIOCCs Training programs began for case managers in each Corp on how to maintain target folders. (p.324-5)

Each Special Branch case handler was required to maintain 10 People’s Intelligence Organization (PIO) cells of 3 agents in each hamlet in his area. (p. 324)

Ed Murphy worked in a CI team in Vietnam where he conducted sabotage operations, investigations, and ran undercover agents. 1969-’70 he worked in Washington for the 116^th Military Intelligence Group doing background investigations and security checks. The following pictures were hung at the 116^th MI unit: Rennie Davis, Abbie Hoffman, Ben Spock, and Jerry Rubin, so that MI agents could spot and identify them. Ed Murphy considered it the Phoenix program in the US. (p. 310-11)

On April 30 1970, the US and S. Vietnam invaded Cambodia; it was the culmination of 12 years of covert action against the government of Prince Norodon Sihanouk. On March 12 1970, Sihanouk’s Prime Minister Lon Nol ordered the N. Vietnamese out of Cambodia within 72 hours. The US invasion was backed by the Khmer Kampuchea Krom, Cambodian exiles trained by the CIA in S. Vietnam, and the Khmer Serai, Cambodians trained by the CIA in Thailand. Lon Nol took control of the government and began mounting military campaigns against the Khmer Rouge. The Cambodian Secret Police, aided by the CIA, began feeding blacklists of targeted Vietnamese to the Khmer Serai and Khmer Kampuchea Krom. (p. 327-8)

In July 1969 the Phoenix Directorate’s Operation chief was Lt. Col. Thomas P. McGrevey, who previously served as a CIA/military liaison in SE Asia and established coordinated intelligence operations in Cambodia, Laos, and S. Vietnam. In 1967 McGrevey facilitated a trilateral agreement between the US, Thailand, and S. Vietnam that resulted in Thai intelligence running joint operations in Cambodia and Laos. In Feb 1970 Lt. Col. Cao Minh Thiep became McGrevey’s counterpart in the Phung Hoang directorate. (p. 329)

The Cambodian invasion was justified by the claim that COSVN headquarters were located near Mimot and were described as “concrete bunkers spread 15-20 feet below surface”. What was thought to be COSVN headquarters turned out be a couple of huts but the invasion deflected attention from Lon Nol’s coup and the concessions Union Oil of CA had secured in Cambodia. (p. 330)

The Phoenix directorate ran operations against the VCI through the use of special teams of enlisted men that had been trained by the CIA in the US then by CIA, SOG, and MACV intelligence at the Ho Ngoc Tau special forces camp. The program never appeared in any CIA roster and it is not known when it was established. (p.331)

Phoenix reports were assessed for Potential Intelligence Recruitment Leads (PIRLS) to use against the VCI. PIRLS were offered incentives from the black market. (p. 331)

Tran Ngoc Chau revealed that there was a systematic campaign carried out in the mid 1950s that used documents, forged by US and British intelligence, to justify Diem’s refusal to negotiate with Hanoi in preparation for the unifying elections of 1956, which never happened. Forged documents are common intelligence operations, called compromise or discreditation operations, and were a standard procedure in the Phoenix program. (p. 332)

The Huston plan, devised to surveil, compromise, and discredit Nixon’s domestic critics, was developed by Tom Huston, President of Young Americans for Freedom. (p. 336-7)

Colston Westbrook, a CIA psywar expert and advisor to the Korean CIA and Lon Nol, was employed from 1966-9 by Pacific Architect and Engineers where he served as an advisor to the Vietnamese Police Special Branch. In 1970 he worked at UC Berkeley where he was assigned the task of forming black cultural associations at the Vacaville Medical Facility to conduct an experimental behavior modification program that programmed unstable persons in the CA prisons to assassinate black community leaders. His most successful client was Donald Defreeze, the chief of the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) (p.337)

In 1971 Nixon directed John Erhlichman, a domestic affairs officer, to form a special White House internal security unit, the Plumbers, directed by Gordon Liddy and Howard Hunt. The Plumbers composed a blacklist of critics of the Nixon administration that included Gregory Peck, Joe Namath, and Stanely Karnow. Illegal methods were used to discredit them. CI operations against the antiwar movement were mounted by the CIA through Operation Chaos, by the FBI through COINTELPRO, by the NSA who used satellites to spy on dissenters, and by the DIA through Operation Shamrock. As a part of Operation Shamrock the 111^th Military Intelligence Group (MIG) in Memphis kept Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. under 24hr surveillance and watched and took pictures of his assassination. (p.337-8)

The My Lai massacre of 1968 was reported in 1970 to be tied to the Phoenix program. It was reported that Evan Parker signed the document approving the blacklist of the people targeted at My Lai. (p.342)

The VNQDD was a Vietnamese militarist party with an international fascist allegiance. The VNQDD gave the Phoenix program the names of Buddhists and their political opponents and described them as communists. (p. 344)

Civilian deaths in S. Vietnam between 1965-1973 were estimated to be 1.5 million. (p. 345)

In 1968, William J. Taylor, an investigator for the Marine Corps Criminal Investigation Division (CID), learned that the Phoenix program conducted acts of terror then blamed it on the VC. He also learned that Phoenix murders in Da Nang were being directed against businessmen on the wrong side of a contractual dispute. (p. 359)

In 1970 2 private companies: SE Asia Computer Associates, managed CIA officer Jim Smith, and Computer Science Corp., under CIA officer Joe Langbien, were contracted to advise 200+ Vietnamese technicians in the scheduled take over of the MACV and CORDS computers. The Vietnamese became involved in Big Mack and PHMIS joined with the National Police Information System, which tracked VCI members through their identification, capture, detention, and release. (p.363)

In 1970, the FBI became involved in Vietnam collecting information on Vietnamese supporters and antiwar groups. In 1971FBI involvement in Vietnam was terminated. (p.367-8)

In 1971, John Tilton was appointed as the 3^rd and last phoenix director, He previously served in Latin and South America and was the CIA station chief in Bolivia when Che Guevara was killed. (p.373)

The New York Times reported in a July 15 1971 article that 26,843 non-military VCI insurgents and sympathizers were neutralized in 14 months through Phoenix. (p.378)

John Tilton organized the National Police Command High Value Rewards Program (HVRP), which placed a bounty price on high level VC political leaders. HVRP was tentatively approved by the Vietnam working group, the Saigon Embassy Internal Unit, the State Dept. Vietnamese desk officer, and MACV, but was disbanded after Oct. 3 1971 due to a New York Times article that was critical of phoenix and prompted the phase out of US involvement. (p.386)

Lt. Col. Connie O’Shea arrived at the Phoenix Directorate in Oct ’71 and was assigned by John Tilton as the liaison to Col. Song of the National Police.

John Tilton and Paul Coughlin worked on the Phung Hoang Reexamination (PHREEX) report, which outlined how to transfer Phoenix to the Vietnamese and was co-authored by CORDS Research and Analysis Division. The report also addressed what activities the US were involved in and to what degree. (p. 389-90)

Recommendations were given to Washington to transfer all anti-VCI missions to the National Police on a time phased basis, which commenced 1972 and to deactivate Phung Hoang committees and centers. The recommendations were approved by Washington but the CIA had no intention of phasing out Phoenix. In Oct 1971, orders went out to all province Special Branch advisors to form Special Intelligence Force Units (SIFU), 8 man teams composed of 4 from the Special Police and 4 from the Field Police, which served as a substitute for the PRU. (p.391)

Rob Simmons, PIC advisor in the Phy Yen Province, worked for the CIA under the cover of the CORDS Pacification Security Coordination Division.

In Dec 1971, George Carver authored the working paper, “Future U.S. Role in the Phung Hoang Program”, written to ensure that the program receive effective US advisory support for an 18-24 month period with an option to continue. (p. 392)

George Carver defined the Phoenix program as an intelligence effort against high level VCI, low level VCI, and an action effort to neutralize both. (p.392)

In 1971 Gen. Khiem announced that Phung Hoang centers and committees would be retained and chaired by himself. The continued Phoenix program included the bounty rewards program. (p.392)

It was debated whether the An Tri (detention) system should be eliminated or institutionalized by transferring them from province security committees to courts. As a result, the An Tri system was reformed into a system of indefinite detention with a periodic review by the Central Security Committee. F6, a Phung Hoang campaign to neutralize VCI by moving against suspects with only 1 adverse report, was authorized by the IV Corps Commander at the same time. On Nov. 25 1972 Thieu signed Decree Law 020 ‘Concerning National Security and Public Order’, which modified An Tri’s power so it applied to times of peace and was broadened to include people deemed dangerous to public order. In 1972 a Newsweek article estimated that there were 45,000 official prisoners in Vietnam with an additional 100,000 in detention centers. (p.400-2)

The Paris cease-fire agreement was signed on Jan 27 1973 officially ending US support of S. Vietnam. Gen. Khiem signed circular 193 that created political struggle committees in the provinces, cities, districts, and villages, which were given jurisdiction over the Phung Hoang committees. MACV was replaced by the Defense Attache Office (DAO) in the US embassy. Under Operation Fast Pass the 500 Military Intelligence Group, commanded by Doug Dillard, had, as its primary responsibility, supporting the US embassy in Saigon with intelligence. Province observers, disguised as civilians working for private companies like Computer Science Corp, were appointed to serve as liaisons with Military Security Services and the Special Branch under the Phoenix program coordinated by the US embassy. The province observers unofficially served as liaisons to the S. Vietnamese armed forces. (p. 405)

PRU advisor Jack Harrell’s Vietnamese counterpart, Tran Ahn Tho, worked for Province Observer David Orr as the principal agent in his stay behind net. The set up of stay behind nets for when a truce goes into effect is the prime mission of intelligence agencies. A US case officer would meet frequently with agents to develop alternative methods communication so agents could be directed and operations could continue whether the case officer was there or not. (p. 405)

A loophole in Article 5 of the cease-fire agreement allowed public safety advisors to stay in Vietnam. (p. 406)

SAFFO (Special Assistant for Field Operations) replaced CORDS and was managed by George Jacobson. The State Dept. Reconstruction and Resettlement Directorate served as a shelter for the CIA. (p. 406)

On May 1 1975 State Dept officer Frank Wisner sent a memo to Washington, ‘Phoenix Goes Underground’, which reported that the Phoenix program was being revived.

(p. 406)

1971-3 Phoenix advisors began participating in drug investigations. PVT, a CIA asset, did a drug investigations into narcotics traffic managed by an Air America dispatcher in Da Nang and discovered that the major traffickers were the Vietnamese police officer in charge of the narcotics investigation in Da Nang and his American Public Safety Advisor. (p. 409)

In 1969, Public Safety advisor Dan Mitrione was captured and killed in Uruguay by guerillas who claimed that he was teaching torture techniques at the International Police Academy (IPA). The IPA was abolished due to criticism and replaced with the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. (p. 413-4)

In 1975 it was reported that the US was still involved with Phoenix, renamed the Special Police Investigator Service (SPIS), and was providing SPIS with data processing facilities through Computer Science Services. (p. 415)

CIA pacification policies in El Salvador were carried out through proxy by allied countries, due to a reduction in the CIA paramilitary forces. Israeli agents taught El Salvadoran landowners to organize criminals into death squads which used intelligence from military and security forces to murder labor leaders and opponents. Taiwanese military officers taught the Kuomintang political warfare techniques at El Salvador’s Command and General Staff College. Subjects included population control through psychological warfare, the development of political cadre within an officer corps, and the placement of military officers in the civilian security forces. (p. 421)

In 1979 reformist officers in El Salvador staged a short lived coup which resulted in the disbandment of the Salvadoran National Security Agency (ANSESAL), formed by the CIA in 1962. ANSESAL was replaced by the National Intelligence Agency (ANI) and landowners moved to Miami, Guatemala, and elsewhere and formed the political front ARENA, led by Major Roberto d’Aubuission. ANSESAL’s files were transferred to general staff headquarters where compiled they were compiled into blacklists. Death squad supervision was managed by Dept. 5, the civilian affairs branch of the general staff. Military targets were handled by Dept. 2, the intelligence branch of the general staff, who passed information to Dept. 3, operations. Death squads were always instructed verbally and dressed as left wing guerillas. In 1981 death squad supervision was handed to the Salvadoran security forces. (p. 422-3)

CIA advisors provided training courses for El Salvador’s general staff. The course on interrogation suggested electroshock and presented architectural plans for secret prisons modeled like a PIC. The interrogation instructor also advised about conducting death squad operations in other countries. (p.423)

Post-Vietnam, the CIA conducted a study of terrorism and 3^rd world instability and, as a result of reports that the CIA would never be able to infiltrate a homogenous terrorist group, anti-terrorist activities were separated from low-intensity or CI activities. In 1981 a military staffed anti-terrorist unit was created under Pentagon’s Joint Special Operations Command by former PRU advisor William Buckley. (p.424)

The Pink Plan was written by former PRU advisor Felix Rodriguez to pacify El Salvador through mobile air strikes conducted as a result of information gathered by intelligence. (p. 424-5)

Post-Vietnam, the CIA defined antiterrorism, an action to undue what a terrorist had done, apart from counter-terrorism, a broad spectrum of action that included a political psywar campaign. (p. 426)

In 1983 William Casey sent CIA officer John Kirkpatrick to Honduras to help with the Contra operation. He reprinted the US Special forces manual issued at Fort Bragg in 1968 in Spanish to use as a training manual. The manual, ‘Tayacan: Psychological Operations in Guerilla Warfare’, was based the motivational indoctrination program Frank Scotton developed in Vietnam. Its goal was to organize the contras into armed propaganda teams that would persuade the public into a general uprising through the use of implicit terror, the knowledge that there are enemies and weapons that will be used against them, explicit terror, and by isolating villagers and cutting off their communication to the outside world to gain their trust and gather information. The manual called for neutralizing public officials and advocated for the hiring of criminals to carry out special jobs. (p. 426-7)

John Singlaub, a former SOG commander, was chosen by Oliver North to work with Robert Brown, Solder of Fortune magazine publisher and creator of the 1974 Phoenix Associates, to head the contra supply operation.

Tom Polgar, former CIA station chief in Saigon, was the chief investigator on the Senate Select Committee probing Iran-Contra. (p. 428)